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THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE
EUROPEAN WAR
When on August I, 1914, the fateful news came over the wires
that Europe stood at Armageddon, the people of this country
were scarcely able to accept the fact, for it was difficult to understand why the flower of European manhood should be sent forth
in arms to shatter the cultural and material progress of a century.
But to the close student of European diplomacy it has long been
evident that some day the conflicting interests of the Great
Powers and some of the smaller states, an intricate system of
alliances, ententes, and secret agreements, and the armaments
accumulated in the last generation must produce a "catastrophe
-of which it is impossible to measure either the dimensions or the
effects" (Mr. Asquith). The various peoples involved have been
preparing against the Great War till most of them were near the
end of their resources, and now that it has come, they have
accepted their fate calmly and bravely, on the ground that even
defeat is preferable to uncertainty. The historian, however,.
is impressed by the peculiar alignment of the warring nations~
It is the first war between Austria and Russia, the first between
England and Germany, the first since 1763 between Germany and
Russia. Except for the Crimean War, France and England have
not fought together since the seventeenth century, nor England
and Russia since the struggle against Napoleon, with whose
country they are both now in alliance. Finally, except when at
the beginning of the eighteenth and again of the nineteenth century they resisted the ambitions of Louis XIV or Napoleon,
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Germany (Prussia) and Austria have been inveterate enemies
since the days of the Reformation.
The causes of the present war are to be traced to four sets of
forces, more or less interdependent: (I) the racial problems and
ambitions of Austria-Hungary; (2) the rivalry of Austria and
Russia in the Balkan peninsula; (3) the struggle to maintain the
balance of power in Europe; (4) the competition for sea power,
commerce, and colonies; not to speak of the burden of armaments entailed by the foregoing rivalries. In this paper an
attempt will be made to describe the development of these questions up to the outbreak of the war.
I.

The Racial Problems of Austria-Hungary

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as is well known, is a
collection of races so organized under the Compromise of 1867
that a majority of Slavs is held down by minorities of Germans
and Magyars in Austria and Hungary respectively. But this
situation has not proved satisfactory to either of the dominant
races, let alone anyone else. The Magyars, in their desire for
greater political and economic freedom from Austria and as the
natural outcome of their political ability, which can be compared
only to that of the Anglo-Saxons, have endeavoured to force their
ways upon the non-Magyar races subject to them, with a view to
increasing the resources available against Austria. Not only
have the Slavs of Croatia and the Rumanians of Transylvania
resented this treatment, against which Austria has afforded them
little relief; their loyalty to the Hapsburg Crown has begun to
weaken, and they have been impressed by the comparatively free
institutions of Servia and Rumania. So the Austrian half of
the Monarchy has learned that Hungarian policy has seriously
weakened the Hapsburg State in international dealings; while to
preserve the unity of the joint army, it has made repeated concessions to Hungary which have merely whetted the appetite
of that partner. Gradually the conviction has spread in the
Monarchy that somehow or other recognition must be afforded
to the national life and consciousness of its conglomerate peoples.
Federalism in one form or another has become a word to conjure
with and absorbed the attention of publicists. Some favour the
creation of a third or Slav kingdom out of Carinthia and Dalmatia (Austrian), Croatia and Slavonia (Hungarian), and
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Bosnia-Herzegovina (a Reichsland); others desire a centralized
organization for the entire Monarchy, with adequate local government for the various races. The late Archduke Francis Ferdinand,
though he talked little and gave his chief attention to the army,
was supposed to favour some such solution. At any rate his sympathies were decidedly with the Slavs; and it is surely an irony
of history .that the one man who had the will and the power to
grapple with the problem should have been cut down on the
eve of his accession to the throne by one of the race whose best
friend he was.
To devise a sound foreign policy on the basis of such racial
antagonisms would be difficult in any case. For Austria the
task is complicated by the foreign connections of some of the
races. The Ruthenians of Galicia are of the same stock and speak
the same language as the Little Russian subjects of the Tsar.
The Croats are practically Serbs, though their Roman Catholicism
separates them somewhat from the latter. In southern Tyrol and
along the Dalmatian coast there is a considerable Italian element,
and Transylvania contains a majority of Rumanians. How far
will these races, all of whom have been at one time or another
susceptible to irredentist propaganda, support the traditional
policy of the House of Hapsburg, has been a question ever
present to the German and Magyar ruling classes.
That traditional policy, as revealed in the annals of four
centuries, is clearly one of territorial expansion. Since her
expulsion from Germany in 1866, Austria-Hungary has regarded
the western Balkans as her theatre of operations, with perhaps
Salonika as the ultimate goal. This ambition is logical enough,
for in the last forty years every Great Power has increased its
territorial possessions. Austria could not be left behind, and in
1878 she was permitted to "occupy and administer" Bosnia and
the Herzegovina, as they constituted the Hinterland to her Dalmatian provinces, though the fiction of Turkish suzerainty was
retained. But she could not hope to advance farther along the
Adriatic coast, because Italy, her ally since 1882, also had designs
on Albania and would have resisted an Austrian occupation.
Early in the twentieth century Russia became interested in the
same region, apart from the fact that Montenegro, whose guns
on Mount Lovchen commanded the Austrian harbour of Cattaro,
had long been a Russian protectorate.
Austria-Hungary was therefore compelled to regard Servia,
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which she surrounded on two sides, as the only region open to her
expansion. A hundred years ago when the Servians under Kara
George were seeking to emancipate themselves from Turkish
ru1e, they repeatedly asked to be annexed to the Hapsburg Crown.
The request was refused, doubtless to the regret of later Austrian
statesmen; but throughout the nineteenth century, Austrian
influence was dominant in Servia, for the family of Obrenovich,
which usually possessed the throne, was too weak to stand alone.
So it was easy for Austria to secure a favourable tariff for her
goods, in return for which Servia was encouraged to export her
live stock to Austrian markets; while the Magyars were free to
carry out their policy in Croatia without fear of agitation inspired from Servia. The value of Austrian friendship was
demonstrated to Servia in 1885. when she rashly attacked Bu1garia to prevent the union of eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria
proper. The aggressor was badly defeated, and only the intervention of the Dual Monarchy stopped the Bu1garian advance
on Nish. After that King Milan and King Alexander were as
clay in Austrian hands; and from 1897, when Russia and Austria
agreed to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, Servia seemed
to have become the permanent vassal of her great neighbour.
This situation was upset by the Servians themselves. In
1903 King Alexander and his consort were murdered in their
palace by Servian officers who resented his Austrophilleanings
and the scandals of his court. The new king, Peter Karageorgevich, was Russian in sympathy, but he determined to
rule as a constitutional monarch, and left his ministers to
their own devices. They cultivated friendly relations with
Turkey, and by introducing modern packing methods, made it
possible to ship Servian meats southwards to Salonika and
beyond. Henceforth Austria cou1d not reduce the politicians of
Belgrade to terms by closing the Hungarian frontier to Servian
cattle.
She was able to break up a Servo-Bulgarian customs
union in 1905, but she cou1d not check the material and financial
progress of Servia, who was strong enough to defy the Monarchy
for six months, to the utter derangement of the latter's finances,
when it proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina
in October, 1908.
That crisis marks the beginning of the tension which ended
with the Austrian u1timatum of Ju1y 23, 19~4. Austrian policy
towards Servia plus Magyar chauvinism in Croatia had led to a
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recrudescence of Pan-Servian agitation, which aimed at the union
of the Serbs of Austria and of Servia under the rule of the Servian
Crown. But the annexation of the "occupied" provinces
blocked the plan, apparently for ever, which was the more serious
because in no other way could Servia hope for access to the sea.
Probably she would have appealed to the sword had not Russia,
France, and Great Britain advised her to yield. Her declaration
of March 3 I, I 909, I stated that "Servia recognizes that the fait
accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights . . . and
she undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of
protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the
annexation since last autumn." As the result of her undertaking
"to modify the direction of her policy with regard to AustriaHungary and to live in future on good neighboudy terms with
the latter," the relations between the two governments assumed,.
an air of" correctness," and a satisfactory commercial treaty was
concluded; but the dormant hostility was revived by the dramatic
events of 1912-1913.
The Ballplatz-the Vienna foreign office-had allowed the
Balkan war against Turkey to proceed on the assumption that the
hated Servians would be promptly trounced. Instead, they
marched to victory, occupied western Macedonia, and at the end
of the campaign proceeded to capture Durazzo on the Adriatic
coast. Not only would this port give the landlocked kingdom
its outlet to the sea; the unexpected successes of Servian arms,
the increase of territory, and the prospect of a permanent Balkan
alliance made a profound impression on the Slav subjects of the
Dual Monarchy, whose racial animosities promised to be considerably accentuated. Furthermore, Servia and Montenegro
had jointly conquered the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, from which
Austria had retired in 1909, and secured a common frontier which
would sometime lead to an integral union of the two states.
This Greater Servia would permanently block the road to Salonika; it could lend powerful support to the Pan-Servian propaganda that was beginning to lift its head again.
The Vienna government, therefore, felt it necessary to impose
a veto upon Servian ambitions and demanded the evacuation of
Durazzo. A dangerous European crisis was produced-for
I It is quite important to remember that this note was delivered to the
Powers, and not to Austria, thus. clearly emphasizing the international character of the Balkan problem.
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Russia seemed disposed to take up the cudgels for Servia-only
to be weathered by the creation of an independent Albania that
was intended to forestall both Servian and Italian aspirations.
But Austro-Servian relations were not improved by this solution,
and when Servia recouped herself by defeating Bulgaria in the
distressing quarrel of the Balkan allies, Austrian rage and disappointment knew no bounds. I The labours of a generation
were wasted, the new Servia was allied with Greece and friendly
with Rumania, and the Slavs of the Monarchy rejoiced greatly
in the success of their brethren.
Under these circumstances the new orientation of Austrian
policy was awaited with interest. Just two weeks before his death
the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was the driving force
behind the aggressive policy of recent years, received Emperor
William at Koposnicht in Bohemia, and according to one story,
secured from him the promise of German assistance for a renewed
Drang nach Osten. A casus belli could easily have been found in
the recent concordat between Servia and the Vatican, by which
the government of Belgrade challenged the traditional claim of
Austria to protect Roman Catholics in the western Balkans.
As it turned out, the murder of the Archduke afforded a more
satisfactory pretext, but it is scarcely open to doubt that had
Francis Ferdinand lived, there would have been extreme tension
between Servia and Russia. Whatever the dispute, Russia would
inevitably have been brought into the dispute.
2.

Austro-Russian Rivalry in the Balkans

The vast expanse of her territory and the fact that the Baltic
is closed to navigation during half the year make Russia's natural
outlet the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, over which Constantinople stands guard; for the greater part of her grain crop, which
is the chief item of her export trade, is raised on the black lands
in the southern provinces of her European empire. The fact
that many ships loaded with Russian grain were cooped up in the
Black Sea when Italy attacked the Dardanelles in 1912 amply
vindicates the national desire for a free passage to the Aegean and
the Mediterranean. But long before economic considerations
I Since this was written, the speech of Signor Giolitti in the Italian parliament has revealed that Austria would have gone to war then had she not been
restrained by her allies.
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assumed their present importance, historical and political forces
were driving the Russians along the chemin de Byzance. They
ever regarded themselves as the heirs of the old Greek empire,
from which they took their two-headed eagle, and they aspired
to bring Russian culture to those southern Slavs who are cut off
from the main Slav stocks by a solid barrier of Germans, Magyars,
and Rumanians. To achieve her goal Russia has resorted to
endless intrigue, formed diplomatic combinations galore, fought
wars innumerable; without, however, advancing her frontier
perceptibly beyond the Rumanian barrier. But if the main
Russian current has made little progress, if Constantinople has
not yet become Tsarigrad, to the great satisfaction of other
powers, it is historically true that as a result of the Russian campaigns against Turkey, though not always as a realization of
Russian plans, five Christian states have arisen in the Balkan
peninsula to become possible outposts of Russian influence.
Of these five, Greece was too far away and until recently too
weak to be of particular service; and Rumania, who had saved
the Russians before Plevna in 1877, only to be "rewarded" by
the seizure of Bessarabia, a trans-Danubian province inhabited
by Rumanians, was by this act of ingratitude thrown into the
arms of Austria-Hungary. But Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, new states with slender resources and thoroughly Slav in
spirit, were excellently suited to serve Russian designs, which
have usually been opposed by Austria-Hungary, lest she be
surrounded on three sides by the same power. So for thirty-five
years after the Congress of Berlin, which put these new states
on the map, Austria and Russia struggled for ascendancy at
Sofia, Belgrade, and Cettinje. For some years Bulgaria was proRussian, Servia pro-Austrian, an arrangement quite to the liking
of the two Great Powers. Prince Ferdinand, however, had
ascended the Bulgarian throne in 1887 against the wishes of the
Tsar, and his people resented the hectoring Russian protectorate;
gradually, therefore, Austria supplanted Russia in Bulgarian
affection. To offset this, the Russophile Peter Karageorgevich
became king of Servia. Thus the protege of one Power blocked
the southward expansion of the other, and since 1903 AustroRussian rivalry has been acute.
About the same time, the intolerable misgovernment of
Macedonia precipitated a general uprising, in which the Bulgarians, Servians, and Greeks thought more of exterminating
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each other than of driving out the Turks who, incidentally
abetted the good work. The European Powers tried to carry
through a programme of reforms which should put an end to the
prevailing anarchy, a task that was really hopeless in the face of
Austro-Russian jealousies; and the British failure to effect a
compromise was a potent cause of the Revolution of July, 1908,
which ushered in the Young Turks, as represented by the Committee of Union and Progress. Other highly interesting schemes
were also nipped in the bud by this convulsion. In January,
1908, Baron Aerenthal, the Austrian foreign minister, ignoring
the agreement of 1897 which guaranteed the status quo in the
Balkans, had secured the concession for a railway through the
Sandjak of Novi Bazar which could be extended to Salonika and
pave the way for Austria's advance to the Aegean. Russia had
countered by proposing a line from Nish, Servia, to the Adriatic
which would block the designs of Vienna and at the same time
serve her own economic interests.
Railways and reforms were alike lost sight of in the consternation produced by the Revolution; and before Europe could
accommodate itself to the new order of things, Austria-Hungary
announced the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina and
Bulgaria proclaimed her independence. Neither act modified
the existing situation in reality, though both were violations of
the Treaty of Berlin, and Russia had, in June, 1908, accepted the
annexation in principle. But she had stipulated that advance notice should be given of its consummation; this had been omitted,
and M. Isvolsky, the Russian foreign minister, felt that he had
been tricked. His vigorous protest was backed by France and
Great Britain, who demanded a European Conference on the
ground that a general European treaty could be revised only
with the consent of all its signatories. The same Powers also
gave their diplomatic support to the Servian demand for compensation. But inasmuch as none of them was willing to fight,
Russia bowed before Germany's intervention "in shining armour," and thanks to the assistance of her ally, Austria scored
a distinct diplomatic success.
In the fullness of time, however, the wheel has come full
circle. The defiance of the public law of Europe was profoundly
resented in Italy, where it was regarded as the first step towards
that Austrian advance along the Adriatic which Italy was determined never to permit. When the opportunity came, Italy
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went to Tripoli, thus shattering the Triple Alliance because her
new colony was at the mercy of the French and British fleets
in the Mediterranean; and when the Turkish resistance proved
stubborn, she encouraged, if she did not abet, the formation of
the Balkan League, which practically extinguished the Turkish
power in Europe. Out of that conflagration arose the new
Servia which has provoked Austria to bring on the present
war. For the sake of an unreal triumph, she has been compelled to stake her very existence and to raise for-let us
hope-a last settlement those problems she desired to avoid
indefinitel y .
During the Balkan troubles, Austrian policy seemed almost
designed to provoke Russia, for the treatment meted out to
Servia and Montenegro by Count Berchtold aroused intense
resentment in Russia. But the Russian government avoided
the trap, if one had been laid. Though making clear its determination to support Servia if the latter were attacked, it unceasingly counselled moderation at Belgrade and Cettinje and
declined to lose patience. In the end, Russia gained enormously.
For, aside from the aggrandizement of Servia, the railway accorded to Servia across Albania to the Adriatic, and the linkingup of that line with the Rumanian system, promised to give
Russia her coveted outlet on the Adriatic, to the intense disgust
of Austrian commercial interests; while Rumania's intervention
in the Balkan quarrel over Macedonia, with the connivance of the
Tsar and contrary to the wishes of the Dual Monarchy, meant
the end of that pro-Austrian policy consistently maintained by
the Bucharest government since the Congress of Berlin. How
completely the situation had changed to the disadvantage of
Austria was clearly revealed in the spring of 1914, when the Tsar
visited Bucharest for the first time since the formation of the
Rumanian kingdom and arranged for the marriage of his
daughter to the heir presumptive of the Rumanian throne. At
the time of writing (November, 1914), Rumania has not intervened in the European war, primarily because the late King
Carol was a Hohenzollern, but her public opinion, which was
never keen for the Austrian alliance, has shown increasing
restiveness, lest the government neglect a unique opportunity
to bring the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Bukowina
under the sceptre of King Ferdinand. Lastly, it was not agreeable from the Austrian point of view that ever since the Bosnian
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crISIS Russia has been distinctly cordial to Italy, who is nominally Austria's ally but really her rival for the control of the
Adriatic.
The truth is, the Balkan policy of the Dual Monarchy had
utterly collapsed, largely because it rested on false premises,
partly because its directors had sadly miscalculated the course
of the Balkan wars; but Vienna could scarcely be expected to
admit defeat without a final effort to save the situation, and
seems deliberately to have prepared for the present war, of which
the murder of the Archduke was merely the occasion, not the
ultimate cause. With respect to the Austrian and Russian
policies, we must guard carefully against rash condemnations of
either, for they are quite as legitimate as those of the United
States, as adumbrated in the Monroe Doctrine. All the Balkan
states would much prefer to work out their destinies free from the
interference of any Great Power, but in their weakness and their
jealousies they have repeatedly turned to their powerful neighbours, and the latter have accepted the omens as suited their
several interests, just as we have done in Central and South
America, with results not always happy or intended.

3.

The General European Situation

The struggle to maintain the balance of power in Europe
is of long standing. From the sixteenth century onwards, the
various nations have never doubted that they could retain their
freedom and their independence only if no one of them overshadowed the others, and whenever a single power has threatened
to become or has become dominant, it has invariably succumbed
to a coalition of its rivals. Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and
Napoleon illustrate the point. Similarly, however much the
issues of the present war may be refined, the simple fact is that
the Allies regard Germany as a menace to their own safety and
have resolutely determined to crush her.
Historically, this state of affairs is in no small degree the
legacy of Bismarckian diplomacy, as exemplified in the unification
of Germany. The necessity and justice of a united Germany are
apparent, but the methods employed by Bismarck to achieve it
have long been the subject of criticism. It is difficult to deny
that the Iron Chancellor isolated diplomatically, then attacked,
and ultimately despoiled Denmark, Austria, and France in turn.
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It is equally true that France, in the person of Napoleon III,
opposed the unification of Germany, and all things considered,
the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was only a just punishment; but the
"editing" of the Ems telegram, which precipitated the war of
1870, was as brutal and diabolical a manceuvre as history records.
In short, splendid as the exploits of Bismarck were from the
German point of view, they generated first in one, then in another, and finally in practically every European country an
intense suspicion of German policy, a fear lest the new Empire
should once again apply the tactics of "blood and iron" for the
purpose of aggrandizement. Nor did Germany endeavour to
remove this impression. Rather, she took advantage of every
ruffie in the international situation to increase her army, which
was already the most formidable in Europe; of recent years she
has harboured the vision of a fleet which should challenge the
armada of England; and she has never hesitated to rattle the
sabre, even going to the point of twice (1875, 1887) threatening
France with war and of issuing an ultimatum to Russia over a
Balkan question not of immediate concern to herself (1909).
Rightly or wrongly, Germany was regarded, at least since the
accession of William II, as the standing danger to the peace of
Europe; and the bases of the present coalition were laid years
ago to ward off, if possible, the very calamity which has at last
overtaken the Old World.
As long as Bismarck remained chancellor, this suspicion of
Germany was less wide-spread. Realizing fully, as he has told us
in his Reflections and Reminiscences, that Germany, in view of the
circumstances of her birth and as a newcomer in the family of
nations, must conduct herself with reserve and circumspection, he
shaped her policy so skilfully that a coalition against her was
neither possible nor necessary. France, he saw clearly, could
undertake a war of revenge only if she were assisted by Austria
or Russia. He therefore built up a Triple Alliance of Germany,
Austria, and Italy, which was unnatural in that the two lesser
partners were hereditary enemies, but was amply justified as a
defensive arrangement (1879-1882). The terms of the alliance
have never been published; but its members have always insisted
on its .purely defensive character, and Italy's neutrality in the
war confirms their view. The repeated renewal of the treaties,
and the fact that no power dared to attack Germany testify to
the prescience of Bismarck; fortunately, he did not live to see his
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handiwork undone by the bungling diplomacy of his successors.
With Russia he concluded secret" insurance" treaties to obviate
the danger of Germany's being dragged into an Austro-Russian
war over Balkan difficulties--one wonders if his ghost haunts the
Berlin foreign office in these parlous days-and with Great Britain
he maintained tolerably cordial relations.
Germany, in fact,
bestrode the continent like a colossus, with the tacit approval of
the other powers (except France), because Bismarck was generally
credited with a desire to keep the peace.
This situation was completely changed after 1890 when
William II, carried away by a determination to govern as well as to
reign, dismissed the statesman who "had cut a certain figure in
the history of Germany and of Prussia." The Emperor announced that "the course remained the same"; but actually his
policy was quite different. Its main features-the creation of
a fleet and the development of imperial ambitions-will be
examined in the next section of this paper; here it will S1:lffice to
continue our account of European diplomacy, in the strict sense
of the words.
One cause of the breach between Bismarck and the Emperor
was the refusal of the latter to renew the secret insurance treaty
with Russia, which was the corner-stone of Bismarck's diplomacy,
pace the Triple Alliance. Finding himself isolated, the Tsar
soon formed that unnatural alliance with Republican France.
which Bismarck had succeeded in preventing and which made it
possible for Germany to be attacked simultaneously on both her
frontiers. There was some evidence, however, that this combination was directed primarily against Great Britain, and William
II was quick to seize the advantage. On the one hand, he
supported Russian policy in the Far East (revision of the Treaty
of Shimonoseki, 1895), on the other he held out the hand of
friendship to France, who was encouraged to send out the
famous Marchand expedition that penetrated to Fashoda, on the
southern border of the Egyptian Sudan, and nearly caused war
between France and England. In 1898, at the time of our war
with Spain, he is believed to have proposed an intervention
against us by Germany, France, and Russia, which was quashed
by the refusal of England; according to one account, he advocated similar action against England when the latter declared
war against the Boer Republics, but was rebuffed by the refusal
of France. These manreuvres are the first symptoms of a rupture
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between Britain and Germany, but they did not prevent a cooperative policy in the Far East during the Boxer troubles, and
in 1901 there was a well-defined movement towards an AngloGerman alliance, despite the outburst of Anglophobia in Germany
during the Boer war. The fact is, the fall of Bismarck left the
diplomatic world without a guiding hand, which was the more
regrettable because the expansionist spirit was still strong, and
in a state of flux anything might happen.
The air was perceptibly cleared by the Anglo-French agreement of April, 1904, the famous entente cordiale, and the AngloRussian Convention of August, 1907. As German writers have
argued that these reconciliations between England and her
traditional enemies were inspired by the deliberate aim of King
Edward VII to isolate Germany and build up a coalition against
her, it is desirable to analyse the general situation with an open
mind. When the Boer war was over, Great Britain found herself almost friendless in Europe, if indeed the Japanese alliance
ensured her position in Eastern Asia. With two Great Powers
she had quarrels of long standing-with France as regards Egypt
and Morocco, with Russia over Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia,
in which neither antagonist was able to score a decisive advantage. It was, accordingly, quite intelligible that the British
foreign office should offer to compromise, and equally reasonable
that its offers should be accepted. After long negotiations France
recognized the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free
hand in Morocco; in this spirit of give and take it was also possible to adjust various disputes in Newfoundland, the Niger region,
Madagascar, Siam, and the New Hebrides. The Russo-Japanese
war having ended in a division of Manchuria between the two
combatants, Russia and England were able to strike a bargain in
the Middle East. Both agreed to keep out of Tibet, Afghanistan
was recognized as under the influence of Great Britain, and Persia
was divided into three spheres of influence, one Russian (in the
north), one British (along the Gulf of Oman), the third lying
between the other two as a neutral zone; while Russia recognized
the predominance of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. No
more important advances in the direction of a sound diplomacy
have been made in a century: the legitimate ambitions of each
party were frankly admitted, and a long list of disputes amicably
settled, anyone of which might and several of which did almost
lead to war. As the various documents stand, they seem to be
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conceived in a spirit of enlightened statesmanship and sound
common sense.
Were there any ulterior motives? Do the facts that by forgetting their own differences France and England got a free hand
against Germany and that Russia, thanks to her agreements with
Japan and England, could interfere with Austrian and German
designs in the Near East, do these facts justify Germany in saying that she is the victim of a conspiracy hatched by England out
of jealousy and joined by the Dual Alliance for the sake of
revanche? Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey, the British
statesmen responsible for the agreements, have repeatedly
declared that they had no point against Germany, the British
government has denied that it was bound by any military arrangements with its diplomatic coadjutors, and British public
opinion has indicated very clearly that it was opposed to a formal
alliance with any European power. None the less, by giving its
diplomatic support to those powers against which Germany's
alliance with Austria and Italy was arranged and by receiving
the support of the same powers against certain German and
Austrian·schemes distasteful to herself, Great Britain did, beyond
a peradventure, pursue a policy actually anti-German and sometimes anti-Austrian; while her traditional friendship with Italy
suggested that the third member of the Triple Alliance was but a
lukewarm partner. But to admit this orientation is to justify
it, historically at least, for British continental policy has been
directed, ever since Wolsey and Henry VIII, towards preserving
the balance of power; and Britain emerged from her "splendid
isolation" in the early years of the twentieth century for the
sound reason that after the Russian disasters in the Far East, the
Dual Alliance was no longer a match for the Teutonic Powers and
because in a variety of ways Germany had shown an unmistakable hostility not to England alone but to her far-flung Empire
as well. But if England was thus driven to protect herself
against Germany, it is equally true that Germany was slowly but
surely being isolated in the diplomatic game. Here, then, was
a situation full of dangerous possibilities, and several times before
1914 an explosion was narrowly avoided.
The German government had manifested little interest in the
Anglo-French agreement, as it did not believe that two nations
who had been rivals for centuries could suddenly strike up an
effective friendship; but when the battle of Mukden pointed to the
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collapse of Russian power, Germany determined to recover her
ascendancy of Europe by an aggressive policy towards France,
which would incidentally test the value of the entente cordiale.
In this fashion arose the question of Morocco, which kept Europe
on tenter-hooks for six years, for Germany claimed that France
and England had no right to settle this problem without her
consent. In the opinion of the writer, this position was thoroughly justified, not only as an assertion that the Concert of
Europe still existed, but also in international law. But when
Germany attempted to impose her solution by threatening France
with war, the British government was bound by its agreement
and by its interests to support France by every means in its power,
as indeed it did in the crises of 1905 and 1911. There is no reason
for doubting that on each occasion the British army was ready for
service in France if Germany pressed matters to the limit, though
in neither case, so far as is known, did Great Britain actually
threaten Germany.
In the light of recent events, it is reasonable to believe that but for British participation in continental
affairs, France would have long since been crushed and Germany
established on the English Channel, and in this fact history will
probably recognize an ample vindication of British policy. It is
necessary, however, to emphasize that this policy was in no way
aggressive, for Anglo-German relations became difficult only when
Germany manifested hostility towards France, and the British
press was almost unanimous in saying that England would have
nothing to do with a war of revenge. Further confirmation of
this view is found in the agreement of November, 1912. "I
agree, " wrote Sir Edward Grey to the French ambassador in London, "that if either government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would
be prepared to take in common." There is absolutely no evidence that either France or England ever regarded the entente
cordiale as a means to attacking the German Empire, which for
that matter, would have been absurd when Russia, the ally of
France and the friend of England, was both unable and unwilling
to fight.
As regards French policy in general, apart from its relations
with England, Germany alternately asserted that it was domi-
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nated by the desire for revenge, and endeavoured to transform it
in her own interest by establishing close economic relations between the two countries. But the proud Republic consistently
rejected the German overtures, except for a few months in 191 It
when M. Caillaux thought of settling the Morocco controversy
on the principle of a joint exploitation. It is almost impossible
to determine how far France still nourished the grievances of 1870.
But her pacific policy during the Balkan crises of 1908-1909 and
1912-1913 and her dignified calm at the time of the Zabem incident suggest that she asked only to be left alone, as far as that
could be reconciled with the Russian alliance.
The Anglo-Russian Convention gave umbrage to Germany
because since it secured England's position in the Middle East,
the latter was willing to support Russian policy in the Balkans,
in as far as it was directed towards securing genuine reforms in
Macedonia. But as such reforms were not popular in Vienna
and Berlin, the story was invented that the object of King Edward's visit to the Tsar at Reval in June, 1908, was to precipitate
a Balkan conflict, at the end of which England, France, and
Russia would divide the Ottoman Empire among themselves
and their clients. No proof of this plot was ever put forward;
had there been any such design, the Bosnian crisis would have
been utilized to further it and would scarcely have ended in the
humiliating defeat of the Triple Entente. Also, it is well known
that Great Britain refused to entertain a Russian proposal for
opening the Straits of Constantinople to men-of-war. Four
years later, during the Balkan wars, Sir Edward Grey repeatedly
accepted the Austrian view in the dispute over Albania, even so
far as to send a British squadron to overawe the Montenegrins
when they captured Scutari and thought to present Europe with
a jait accompli. If Great Britain had formed an alliance, even
defensive, why did Sir Edward Grey, in those momentous days
of last July, persistently refuse to declare the solidarity of
England with'the other powers of the Triple Entente, despite
the most urgent entreaties from Paris and St. Petersburg? We
now know that in 1912 Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey offered
to make the following declaration to Germany:
"The two powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship
between them, Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any
unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression against Germany is not the
subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to
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which Great Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything
which has such an object."

To this proposal, Germany returned an unsatisfactory answer.
She not only refused to take a corresponding obligation, but she
demanded a pledge of British neutrality in the event of Germany's
being engaged in war of any kind. Obviously, Great Britain
could make no such promise, for Germany could then begin a
war of aggression at her convenience and could even overrun
Belgium with impunity. Nothing, therefore, came of these
negotiations.
Nevertheless England persevered in the attempt to arrange
an understanding with Germany. Sir Edward Grey has himself
stated that as a result of the pacific policy pursued by both governments during the Balkan wars their relations "sensibly improved. " Influential individuals and societies-on both sides
of the North Sea-sought to dispel whatever of hostility there
was between the English and German peoples, and there was a
wide-spread desire in both countries for an agreement. The
possibilities in that direction, as far as England was concerned,
may be imagined from Sir Edward Grey's despatch of July 29,
1914, in which he returned to his idea, "hitherto too Utopian, "
of a general peace treaty. "If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed," runs this historic
document, "my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be
assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued
against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, either
jointly or separately." This must surely destroy once for all the legend that the one aim of British policy was to surround Germany
with a ring of iron, and when the circle was complete, precipitate a general war. Britain's case against Germany may
safely rest upon this unprecedented proposal, and upon the
subsequent offer that if France and Russia would not accept
"any reasonable proposal . . . to preserve European peace,
. . . His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to
do with the consequences."
The refusal of the German government to respond to any of
these overtures is the most tragic feature of the war. Were
London reconciled with Berlin, it might play the mediator between Paris and Berlin. Frenchmen had certainly not for-

214

THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY

gotten Alsace-Lorraine, but they were tired of militarism, and they
had shot their last bolt in the revival of three years' service. If
the Republic could have been guaranteed against attack, and if
Germany could have brought herself to concede genuine selfgovernment to the disputed provinces, one cannot help thinking
that in time France would have abandoned the Russian alliance.
A peace league of France, Germany, and England was not more
unthinkable than was a few years ago the reconciliation of
England with France and Russia. Then, if the German military
party was bent on war, it could have waged a campaign against
Russia, in which the sympathy of the world would have been
with Germany.
Why should Germany wish to fight Russia or Russia Germany?
Hitherto, as joint abettors of the partition of Poland, they have
considered their interests identical in restraining the schemes of
the Poles to recover their independence and in preserving monarchical absolutism generally against the democratic demands
of the last fifty years. Likewise in the domain of high policy
co-operation was long the order of the day. At the time of the
Crimean War, Prussia steadfastly resisted the urgings of France
and England to join them. and was rewarded by Russian neutrality in the wars of 1866 and 1870 against Austria and France,
without which Prussian triumphs would have been impossible.
Bismarck, to the end of his career, "kept the wire open to St.
Petersburg" ; and if William II abandoned this policy, he managed
to preserve excellent personal relations with the Tsar and up to a
few years ago supported Russian designs in the Middle and Far
East. As recently as 1910 Russia accepted the German proposals
for the Baghdad railway, and was then enthusiastically praised
in the German press for what appeared to be an abandonment of
France and Great Britain, which countries were then the chief
antagonists of German diplomacy. Germany did not then regard
herself as the bulwark of European civilization against Muscovite
aggression; nor can it be forgotten that during the Russian
revolution, the authorities of Berlin afforded every facility to the
Russian government for tracking down' and capturing Russian
revolutionaries in Germany.
Russo-German intimacy was shattered by two circumstances.
First, Russian opinion has gradually become convinced that the.
road to Constantinople lies throv.gh Berlin. Bismarck's conduct
at the Congress of Berlin, where he supported England and
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Russia in demanding the revision of the Treaty of San Stephano,
dictated as it was by the Russians at the gates of Constantinople,
caused profound resentment throughout the Tsardom and has
never been forgotten. Thanks to this, the Russian government
had no little difficulty in restraining the popular demand for
war in 1908-1909 when Germany supported Austria-Hungary
in the annexation of Bosnia, and again in 1912-1913 in the creation of an independent Albania. Add to this that German culture
has long been unpopular in Russia; that the commercial treaty
dictated by Germany during the war with Japan was rather
unfavourable to Russian interests, and that Germany would
insist upon its renewal; that Russian material prosperity and
industrial development has made enormous strides in the last
five years, but is hampered by the lack of an ice-free port; and
that for two decades Germany has done her best to regenerate
Turkey with the purpose of checking the Russian advance: and
it is quite clear why the present war is immensely popular with
the Russian masses.
On the other hand, the Balkan revolution upset the existing
situation entirely to the advantage of Russia. The crash of the
Ottoman Empire relieved the Balkan states of the pressure from
the south and correspondingly aggravated the difficulties of the
Dual Monarchy, whose Balkan policy Germany had made her
own, in spite of Bismarck's warning. It was also problematical
how long Turkey could survive her last operation. From the
German point of view it was not unnatural that the peace
strength of the German army should be increased to 875,000 men.
But the rest of the world saw only additional proof that every
increase of armaments had been begun by Germany, and it could
point out that when the other continental nations had followed
the example of Germany, the latter's position was no better and
no stronger than before, indeed rather weaker. For Russia,
irritated by the German chancellor's prediction of a struggle
between Germanentum and Slaven tum and the sudden contempt
manifested in Germany for all things Russian, began to stiffen
her back. She entered a vigorous protest against the reorganization of the Turkish army by a German general (January, 1914),
and allowed the Russian press to reply in kind to a particularly
abusive article in the Cologne Gazette. These trivialities became
serious with the Russian announcement that a practice mobilization of the army was contemplated for the autumn of 1914; to
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which the German press replied by freely discussing the desirability of a preventive war with the Russian colossus.
In this atmosphere of tension and mutual exacerbation, the
Austrian ultimatum was hurled at Servia on July 23. And when
we read in the German White Paper that "we (Germany) gave
Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Servia"; that
"any action which she might consider it necessary to take . . .
would receive our approval"; and that "we were fully aware in
this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would draw Russia into the field"; it is
difficult to believe that Germany was not entirely willing for
war to come.
The main point of this rather detailed narrative will be
missed if it has not become apparent that since the accession of
William II German policy has pursued no definite goal as regards
the other powers, but has been everything by shorts and nothing
long. And not only has German policy been incalculable: there
has been a great deal of talk about the mailed fist, much rattling
of the sabre, and a wide-spread ventilation of the idea that Germany could "lick all creation"; while particular German diplomatists have exhibited a lack of savoir faire most distressing to .
the polished agents of the older nations. Germany's position
in the world assuredly was not all that she could desire, in spite of
her army; but if she has failed to improve it, the blame must
rest chiefly with the Emperor, his four chancellors, and the
successive occupants of his foreign office. One and all, they
have shown but little of that spirit of give and take which is the
secret of success, they have preferred force to argument, and they
have convinced the rest of Europe, not to say the world, that the
ambitions of the Pan-Germans represented the official policy.
It is significant that one must search far and wide in German
discussions of international problems for even a suggestion that
other powers might have legitimate grievances against Germany,
or that they might not in good conscience regard their interests
from the German point of view. Jealousy of German commercial
progress has perhaps had something to do with her present isolation; but the United States has managed to acquire colonies, to
develop a considerable foreign commerce, and to build a powerful
navy without exciting universal fear. The trouble with Germany
is, she has tried to emulate Bismarck; but she has not asked herself
what was possible, and she has not produced statesmen of his
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calibre who knew how or were able to control a situation created
by themselves.
4. The Question oj Expansion
Behind these various struggles for influence in the Balkans
and in support of the balance of power, there is the problem provided by expansionist ambitions of most of the Great Powers. It
is a work of supererogation to discuss whether any of the nations
actually needs lands beyond the sea or an increase of European
territory: it is sufficient to recognize that none of them, with the
possible exception of Great Britain, has been satisfied with its
present possessions, and it is safe to say that at the end of the war,
whichever side is victorious, the vanquished will have to cede
territory, either in Europe or elsewhere, or likely enough in both.
In fact, the disposition of other lands and other peoples has been
the chief occupation of the European chancelleries for the last
generation; the disputes chronicled in the first three sections of
this paper show how fragile has been the framework of the European state system when confronted with conflicting colonial ambitions, and Armageddon has come precisely because certain
powers conceived that their aspirations could be realized only
at the point of the sword. On the whole it is difficult to say
that one government has been more responsible than its rivals
for the tension, for all have at one time or another been arrogant
and unscrupulous, and to this extent all are equally responsible
for the war.
In the division of the spoils the Germanic powers have fared
least well. Austria-Hungary has added only the contiguous
provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and has seen her
cherished schemes indefinitely postponed by the Balkan wars of
1912-1913. Germany has planted her flag in German East and
Southwest Africa, the Cameroons and Togoland and Kiaochao
and on a few insignificant islands in the Pacific; but by the side of
the enormous possessions of Great Britain, France, and Russia,
these acquisitions are mere driblets. To make matters worse,
Germany has witnessed an enormous expansion by her present
enemies in the last thirty years-England in Burmah, Egypt,
and South Africa; France in Tonkin, Morocco, the Sahara and
beyond; Russia in Central Asia and Manchuria, not to mention
her growing influence in the Balkans; even little Belgium has
secured, in the Congo, a domain more valuable than all the
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German colonies together. Nor has it escaped Germany's
attention that France and Russia have more or less excluded
commercial competitors from their preserves, and that much
talk has been heard of a customs union within the British
Empire which would make that astonishing aggregation of lands
and peoples a self-sufficing economic entity.
Germany's position is, indeed, difficult enough. The country
is fast becoming a replica of England. Food is imported in
increasing quantity, and for their raw materials German manufacturers are more and more dependent upon the produce of
other nations and their colonies. Only a small proportion of
Germany's exports go to her colonies, as against the fact that
France, England, and Russia find their best markets in their
dependencies. N ow there is nothing to prevent any of these
countries, in a moment of jealousy or blindness, from shutting
Germany out of both her export and import markets by measures
perfectly warranted in international law. Furthermore, the
population of Germany is greater than that of France or the
white-peopled dominions of the British Crown, yet the German
emigrant who demands an agreeable climate cannot settle in a
land ruled by the Kaiser's government.
In short, Germany contends that she, the most marvellous industrial and commercial nation of the age, which in normal
circumstances will one day overtake the United Kingdom in the
gross amount of its foreign trade, has not found a "place in the
sun" commensurate with her greatness and possibilities. Prosperous as she is to-day-or was on the eve of the war-a hundred
years hence she will be at the mercy of her present enemies and the
United States, all of which possess enormous tracts of land which
they are not now adequately using. Why should not Germany,
whose civilization and culture are equal if not superior to that
of any other nationality, be given a chance to share in the development of virgin soils and backward races? Is not Deutschland
ilber Alles as reasonable a slogan as Britannia Rules the Waves?
And Germany believes that for years the allied Powers have
intrigued and endeavoured to surround her with a network of
alliances which should once for all forestall those ambitions whose
realization is a matter of life and death with her; that out of
sheer jealousy of her wonderful commercial expansion, they have
denied to her the resources on which her future depends.
There is not much truth in the charge. To begin with, during
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the eighties, when the scramble for Africa was at its height and
Germany had every opportunity to acquire overseas possessions,
Bismarck deliberately encouraged France in a policy of colonial
adventure, with the expectation of embroiling her with England
and Italy and of diverting her from a war of revenge. The ruse
was successful, and Germany was not attacked; but it was overlooked that however much Britain and the Latin nations might
quarrel with each other, they acquired the best lands in Africa
and Asia, the very regions that Germany has desired of recent
years to possess for herself. It is further to be remarked that
Germany obtained her four African colonies through the good
will of Great Britain, who in each case resigned valid claims of her
own in order to gratify German ambitions; all differences between the two powers were satisfactorily adjusted by the Convention of 1890, which provided, inter alia, for the cession of
Heligoland to Germany, the best possible proof that Great
Britain cherished no animosity towards the great continental
power. As regards France, Germany courted her so assiduously for twenty years after 188o that a conflict of colonial
ambitions was unthinkable and non-existent.
In the last decade Germans have complained bitterly of
Franco-British opposition to their most cherished schemes,
namely, the Baghdad railway and a partition of Morocco in
which they should have a share. The last independent state of
Africa Minor, the Shereefian empire, had long been a victim of
European intrigue without falling a prey to it. Geography
suggested that it would round off the French Mediterranean
possessions; but a convention of 1880 had made Morocco a kind
of international hunting-ground. The Anglo-French agreement
of 1904, which recognized French predominance there, was concluded without Germany's being consulted. Instead, however, of
protesting, the Kaiser's government declared its "cordial"
acceptance of an arrangement that augured well for the peace
of the world; not till after the battle of Mukden did William II
decide that Morocco must be preserved in its territorial integrity
and independence (speech at Tangier, March 31, 1905).
The two statements of policy were quite contradictory, but
each excluded Germany from that share of Morocco which her
pUblicists and politicians insistently demanded. To the end of
the controversy her policy remained obscure: in 1906 the Algesiras
Conference at her demand appointed France and Spain as the
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agents of the Powers, and Morocco was formally internationalized;
in 1909 Germany once more recognized the predominant political
interests of France; in 19II when France, accepting the omen,
occupied Fez, the German government protested and sent a
cruiser to Agadir, which port, under the international arrangements sanctioned by Germany herself and to which she appealed,
was not open to foreign ships. France was certainly not blameless in the long discussion, for with the connivance of Great
Britain she had practically nullified the Act of Algesiras and she
had not accorded Germany the economic privileges guaranteed
in the Convention of 1909; but at least she never concealed her
ambition to annex Morocco sooner or later. In the crisis of 1911
Germany began, there is much reason to believe, with the intention of taking southwest Morocco for herself; in the end she
allowed France to establish a protectorate, in return for concessions of French territory in central Africa that brought her in
touch with the Congo, upon which she had long nourished designs.
Germany may have changed her plans because of English intervention; but had she stuck to the position assumed in 1905, that
Morocco must not be absorbed by any European power, she
would have been on unchallengeable ground. The conclusion
seems to be that Germany was using Morocco as a means of
testing the friendship of England and France, and regarded the
acquisition of territory in that region as of secondary importance.
Naturally enough, Great Britain gave France the support promised in 1904; but she favoured Germany's policy of the open
door, and she raised no objection to the territorial rearrangements
in the Congo basin. In his speech of November 27, 19II, anent
the controversy, Sir Edward Grey stated that British expansion in
Africa was undesirable, and that "if Germany has friendly arrangements to negotiate with other foreign countries with regard
to Mrica, we are not anxious to stand in her way any more than in
theirs"; Britain was not pursuing" a dog-in-the-manger policy."
As regards the Baghdad Railway, Germany had a clear case.
From the economic point of view, British and French as well as
German, there was no reason why a railway should not be built
from Constantinople across the Anatolian plateau to Baghdad
and ultimately to the Persian Gulf, and at first there was no
opposition; in fact, the concession was obtained from the Sublime
Porte with British help. But British and French capitalists
were offered only a minor share of the stock, and were excluded
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from the management; the kilometric guarantees assumed by the
Turkish government prejudiced the work of reform in Macedonia, and must lead to an increase of the Turkish customs; and
German publicists began to show how an attack on Egypt would
be feasible after the line was completed. So the British government refused its consent for many years. But the situation was
changed after the German failure in Morocco and the Italian
occupation of Tripoli: Germany could never dominate the
Mediterranean, which is the highway of the British Empire; and
in 1913 both England and France withdrew their opposition to
the Baghdad line, which had been accepted by Russia in 1910.
A few more years of peace, and Germany would have achieved
a diplomatic and economic triumph for which the whole world
would have been grateful.
Here attention must be ca11ed to a fact which has been practically ignored in the chaos of the war. Early in the summer of
19 1 4 an agreement was reached between Great Britain and Germany which proves up to the hilt that the former was not afraid
of German expansion. While the details have not been published, it is known that Great Britain gave Germany a free hand
in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, thus removing the last obstacle
to the Baghdad line, and that an understanding was reached as
to the disposition of the Portuguese colonies and the Belgian
Congo in case their present owners were willing to se11 part or
a11 of those lands.
But probably no amount of argument and exposition wi11 ever
convince Germany that England was not her inveterate enemy;
for by the very fact of being in possession of the most desirable
lands of the globe, the British Empire was a standing challenge
to German ambitions. Having by a variety of means, many of
them questionable from an austere moral standard, established
herself all over the world, England clearly desired the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the status quo, and her
complacency received a profound shock by the advent of a power
that demanded recognition as an equal, that conceived its
civilizing mission in large and vigorous terms. To Germans
English suspicions savoured of jealousy, English preparations of
hypocrisy, a favourite word in their political discussion; and it was
particularly unpalatable that more than a million Germans had
found new homes in the scattered British dominions, where they
had lost touch with their Fatherland. In the fiery lectures of

222

THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY

Heinrich von Treitschke, Great Britain was pictured as a great
robber state, to which the world rendered an unwilling tribute;
her naval supremacy was called an anachronism in an age when
all nations used the ocean as a highway of commerce; and her
supposed hostility to the cause of German unity was proclaimed
a sufficient reason why Germany should attempt a settlement
with perfide Albion, which should be "the longest and most
difficult of all." How widely these ideas had been disseminated,
was revealed at the time of the Boer War, when all Germany
seemed to pour forth a long-cherished hatred and contempt of
England and her institutions; an explosion not unintelligible when
one recalls the outburst of the Saturday Review. "Were the
German fleet destroyed tomorrow," wrote the organ of Tory
chauvinism on September 18, 1897, "there is not an Englishman
in the world who would not be the richer . . . Germaniam esse
delendam."
As the German government made no effort to
restrain the excesses of the press, Englishmen assumed that
German policy was dictated by a considered hostility to their
Empire and let loose the vials of their own wrath upon their
Teutonic kinsmen. The press of both countries continued for
years to poison the minds of their readers; and if indeed the
circumstances under which this war began show that English
suspicions were justified, it is none the less true that the attitude
of public opinion on both sides of the North Sea made the negotiation of an agreement, or at least a detente, unusually difficult, if
not impossible.
The real issue between Germany and England, however, has
been neither the fulminations of the press nor the complaints
of diplomatic hostility, but the growth of the German navy.
For this rivalry geography is primarily responsible. The only
shore line of the German Empire is that of the North Sea and the
Baltic, from which its merchant fleets go forth to the ends of the
earth. But across their lines of communication lie the British
Isles. It is strictly true, as the war has convincingly demonstrated, that by closing the Straits of Dover and the North Sea
from Scotland to Norway, the British navy can prevent a single
German merchantman from reaching the Atlantic Ocean; in
other words Germany's foreign commerce lies at the mercy of a
foreign power. On these grounds the Kaiser has demanded of
his people, and they have willingly provided, the sinews for the
construction of a fleet "so strong that even for the adversary
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with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would involve such
dangers as to imperil his own position in the world." This
quotation from the memorandum attached to the German Navy
Law of 1900 indicates precisely the ground on which Germany
has justified her enormous naval expenditure in the last sixteen
years. Germany has built her fleet solely for purposes of defence,
in particular for the defence of her commerce. Nor, on theoretical grounds, can any power take umbrage at this argument, and
England has always justified her colossal navy on the ground that
she must always keep the sea open for the supplies of food and
raw materials, any cessation in the regular arrival of which would
lay her open to starvation and revolution.
Why then has the United Kingdom regarded the creation of a
German fleet with suspicion, and strained every nerve to keep a
handsome lead? In the first place, because England's position
is unique. No other nation in the world depends absolutely upon
the sea for its subsistence. Even to-day, when her flag has been
swept from the' ocean, Germany is able to import goods through
neutral countries and to carryon some export trade. England,
on the other hand, "will be the sea's victim on the day she ceases
to be its queen." If it is urged that Great Britain can escape from
her predicament by consenting to the inviolability of private
property at sea in time of war, she replies that she cannot surrender the one weapon available to her for the crushing of an
enemy-unless she were to raise a conscript army, which would
be more burdensome than the cost of her navy. Besides, as war
on land interrupts commerce between the belligerents, it is
logical that maritime intercourse must be similarly suspended.
The problem is really insoluble, and both England and Germany
long ago recognized the fact.
In the second place, the German fleet was constructed under
circumstances that Great Britain could not disregard. In order
to arouse public sentiment in favour of a large naval programme,
the Navy League, which is little more than a branch of the
Admiralty, conducted a vigorous campaign in which the menace
of the British fleet was adduced as the chief argument. The
press and the professors in the state-controlled universities used
the most unbridled language, and even in high quarters little
reserve was shown. ee As my grandfather reorganized the army,"
said the Kaiser on January I, 1900, e, so shall I reorganize my navy,
without flinching and in the same way, so that it will stand on the
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same level as my army [the most powerful in the world], and that
with its help, the German Empire shall reach a place which it
has not yet attained." To this may be added another quotation
from the memorandum of 1900: "It is not absolutely necessary
that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the
greatest naval power, because a great naval power will not, as a
rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against
us." The point of this remark lay in the fact that in 1900 the
British fleet was scattered all over the world; the most powerful
ships were stationed in the Mediterranean, and home waters were
practically defenceless, a distribution dictated by the political
and strategic problems of the Empire. But in view of the creation of a German fleet, which seemed intended for use against
England, it was necessary to abandon most of the foreign stations and concentrate the squadrons nearer home; a process
which, begun in 1904, ended with the practical withdrawal even
from the Mediterranean. This necessity was an important
factor in bringing about the agreements with France and Russia,
and Germans have argued that this shifting of British naval
power was a sign of aggressive intentions; the chronology of the
process, however, shows that each step was taken after and not
before each increase of the German navy.
The third reason for England's distrust of Germany was
i
found in the size and character of the German fleet. The navy ;:1
law of 1900 provided for a fleet of thirty-eight battleships, four- .~
teen large cruisers, and thirty"'eight small cruisers, together with a .j
large torpedo-boat flotilla, to be completed by 1920. Laws of
1906 and 1912 increased this programme to forty-one battleships
and twenty cruisers; by substituting battle cruisers for the
cruisers, and by providing for the automatic replacement of
obsolete ships, the scheme envisaged a fleet of sixty-one battleships of the latest type, that is to say, of Dreadnoughts, which
would constitute the most powerful armada in the history of the
world. As the Dreadnought type was introduced by the British
Admiralty, it is fair to say that by its own action it superseded
the splendid fleet created since the Naval Defence Act of 1899.
The all-big-gun ship, however, had been foreshadowed by Italian
and American constructors, and it was the intelligent anticipation of England in 1905 which has given her such overwhelming
odds against her present enemy, if indeed at an enormous and
ever-increasing cost. But sixty-one battleships of any kind
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would have worried Englishmen, because battleships are not
built to protect a nation's commerce; that function appertains
to light cruisers, of which Germany has built few, and a battle
fleet was superfluous for her coast defence. Convinced, therefore,
by the size and character of the German fleet and the tone of
public discussion in Germany that England or her Empire would
one day be the victim of German aggression, Englishmen submitted to heavy taxation in order to preserve a margin of even 60
per cent. for their own navy, and it may be that the future historian
will lay upon England the responsibility for the burden of armaments which has given the war its Titanic mould. In justice to
Germany one must admit that a section of the Conservative
party in England advocated a "preventive" war against Germany before her fleet became too formidable. The Civil Lord
of the Admiralty, in the Balfour government, said at a dinner,
according to one account, that the German fleet could be destroyed before people read in the newspapers that war had been
declared. In 1909 there was a kind of panic about the alleged
inadequate shipbuilding programme of the Asquith government,
in the course of which Germany was accused of secretly accelerating the construction of its ships; and much against its will the
Liberal cabinet was constrained to sanction the addition of eight
Dreadnoughts in a single year. Likewise, the movement for
universal military service, so ably conducted by the late Lord
Roberts, was bound to give offence in Germany, because she was
openly referred to as the enemy against whom a conscript army
might be used.
On the whole, however, the present government of Great
Britain sincerely exerted itself to moderate the naval rivalry. In
1906 and 1907 it built only three capital ships, instead of the four
recommended by the late Conservative ministry, and in 1908
only two; without meeting with any response from Germany, who
increased her programme (two ships in 1906, three in 1907, four
in 1908: this was the cause of the panic of 1909). At the Hague
Conference of 1907 the British delegates were instructed to propose a limitation of armaments, to which Germany demurred.
Since 1911, when he became First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr.
Winston Churchill has twice proposed "a naval holiday," and
finally struck an unofficial bargain with Admiral von Tirpitz
for a ratio of sixteen to ten in the construction of battleships.
In addition, from 1907 to 1912 the British government con-
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ducted intermittent negotiations with Germany anent the whole
question. Germany demanded a political agreement, and
assuredly this was the one avenue of escape from an insuperable
dilemma; for only if each government was convinced of the sincerity arid good faith of the other, was it possible, under the
circumstances, to ignore the possibility of an unprovoked attack.
So in 1912 Great Britain offered to pledge herself not to attack
Germany or to join any combination which had such an object
in view. This was not satisfactory to Germany, who required
a declaration of absolute neutrality on the part of England in
any war to which Germany might be a party, and the idea was
dropped. Nevertheless, the resolute determination of Great
Britain to retain her maritime supremacy, the abundant proof
that she was riot a colossus with feet of clay, and the rally of the
Empire to her assistance had left its impression upon Germany;
and in view of the colonial agreement the outlook for a definitive
naval understanding was promising.
/
As regards the commercial rivalry of England and Germany,
which in some quarters is held up as the real cause of their war,
it may be remarked that for years Germany has been England's
best customer, not excluding British India, and that she has
bought more from Germany than any country except the United
States. The reciprocal trade of the two nations in 1913
amounted to over 1'100,000,000. Again, an examination of the
trade figures shows that about 7S per cent. of Germany's foreign
commerce is with countries of the European continent, to which
Great Britain sends only about 40 per cent. of her exports; in
the overseas dominions of the British Empire, with which the
110ther Country does one-third of its business, German commerce
has but a slight hold. While it cannot be denied, therefore, that
there is a certain general competition between the two countries,
it is quite evident that this has been very much exaggerated, and
that they are mutually dependent. Finally, it is a gross misrepresentation to say that British trade is being extinguished by the
advance of Germany. Germany had to catch up with England's
lead of three-quarters of a century, and since 1907 the former has
about held her own. The following table, which is calculated
in millions of dollars, speaks for itself. I
I Approximate figures only.
The exports from the United Kingdom refer
to British products only. The re-export trade would increase the exports by
about one-fourth.
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GERMANY

YEAR

%
% Exports % Imports % Export
Imports increase
increase
increase
increase

-

------ ------ ------ --- ---

1890
1899
1903
1907
19 11

2100
2425
27 10
322 5
3400

19 11
19 12
19 13

3400
3775
3845

15
12
19
6
6
II

1.9

13 15
1320
1450
21 30
2270
2270
2435
26 30

0

10
47
6
6
7·5
8

1120
1360
15 80
2250
23 85

2I.5
16
42
6

12 50
1770
202 5

27
25
41
11.5

23 85
253 0
266 5

6
6
5

202 5
218 5
2480

1I.5
7·9
13·5

79 0
1000

But these figures do not consider the growth of population,
which between 1890 and 1910 stood at 26 per cent. for Germany,
as opposed to 18 per cent. for the United Kingdom. From the
following table showing the exports per head of the population, it
would appear that the advantage, in recent years, actually rests
with England.
UNITED KINGDOM

GERMANY

Average 1900- I 904
"
1907- 19 10
19 11 - 19 13

$3 1.81
44.3 2
54·55

$19.78
25. 81
34.3 1

Increase 1900-1913

$22·74

$14·53

Leaving figures aside, it would be exceedingly difficult to prove
that the British people were jealous of Germany's prosperity.
Intelligent discussion of the subject always emphasized the fact
that the two countries were partners, not rivals; the tariff reform
movement, which was to save England-and the Empire-from
German competition was repudiated in three general elections;
neither in the United Kingdom nor in any part of the Empire
governed from London-that is, except in the self-governing
dominions-have Englishmen enjoyed any trading privileges that
were not available for Germans as well. Since the war began,
there has been no looser statement than that which ascribes
England's participation to a jealousy of Germany's commercial
prowess; for war means the interruption of business, and England
suffers more from that than any other nation.
There is, then, no reason for rejecting Mr. Asquith's statement that Great Britain is fighting for the maintenance of the
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public law of Europe and the right of small nationalities to exist;
to which may be added, considerations of enlightened selfinterest. Until the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany,
English opinion was almost unanimous in favour of standing
aside, and Sir Edward Grey repeatedly told France that English
help was dependent upon popular sentiment. The promise of
naval assistance was not given until Germany had sent her
ultimatum to Paris, and that was conditional. But the German
affront to Belgium left England no alternative. The promise
to compensate Belgium after the war and to respect her independence and integrity, coming as it did from a government which,
on its own admission, had broken its pledged word, was obviously
worthless, apart from the fact that the exponents of German
expansion have long held that Belgium must one day be incorporated in the German Empire. Now since the fourteenth century
England has consistently opposed the absorption of the Low
Countries by a strong power; this was the issue in her struggle
with Louis XIV, and she entered the lists against the French
Revolution precisely because the First Republic was bent on
extending its frontier to the Rhine. So in 1914. The aggression
of Germany threatened to upset the balance of power; were she
successful, would not England be her next victim? The truth
is, so inevitable was the participation of England if Belgium were
molested that Germany must actually have desired to see England drawn in; or else her statesmen and diplomatists are the
sorriest and most incapable that ever directed the destinies of a
great nation.
The documents found in Brussels merely show that England
was prepared to resist a German invasion of Belgium; and in the
spring of 1913 Sir Edward Grey officially assured the Belgian
government that England intended to respect the neutrality of
Belgium if other powers did so. Until Germany can prove that
an unprovoked attack upon her by way of Belgium was planned
by Great Britain, we shall continue to hold the mistress of the
seas guiltless of provoking the great conflagration and justified
in taking part. As to her "bloodguiltiness" and" treachery"
to the Teutonic race, it is enough to remember that Germany
did not discover "the Slav peril" until two years ago, and that
for more than a decade she has been practically the ally of the
Unspeakable Turk.
With every desire, therefore, to do justice to Germany's
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appeal for a fair judgment, one can only admit that in the court
of history she must bear the major responsibility for the greatest
of all wars.
In conclusion, one cannot help feeling that behind the mazes
of diplomacy and the ambitions of nations, there has long existed
on the part of governments and peoples alike, or certain of them,
a subconscious desire to make use of the colossal armaments
accumulated during the last generation. Not that there was
any murderous intent or willingness to be shot, but the battleships and the armies had produced no return as investments, and
in spite of Norman Angell's argument that war does not pay in
the long run, many millions of men were certainly disposed to
have at least one more try before the world settled down to a
monotonous and everlasting peace. The fighting spirit is not
yet dead in the human race; on the contrary, modern democracies
have often shown themselves more chauvinistic than the governments entrusted with the conduct of international relations.
Nor are the hatreds and animosities engendered by centuries of
conflict and aspiration to be killed off in a day, even by an appeal
to the pocket-book. To the peoples of Europe Louis XIV and
Frederick the Great, Napoleon and Bismarck still stand for great
causes or great crimes; while the wars of the nineteenth century
left behind them more problems than they solved. And so, just
as the individual will often sacrifice his material welfare on the
altar of an ideal, the embattled nations of Europe are willing to
suffer infinite pains if only their several destinies, as they conceive them, may find opportunity of realization.
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